More founders and investors debating China’s rise should go and visit

In June, I spent two weeks in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong meeting dozens of biotech founders, scientists, professors, investors, CEOs, and clinicians.
I went in with a mindset that biotech in the U.S. was in serious trouble. I left thinking it didn’t surpass the best of what America has to offer, and overall contained a lot of unappreciated nuances.
Undoubtedly, China’s ability to move experimental therapies into patients quickly and cheaply is a real structural advantage. But I was also surprised to find how accessible and open to collaboration that side of things felt too (at least in the most immediate political moment).
It made me think it would be great to turn down some of the heat and see if there are win-win ways for US and China startup ecosystems to work together. Below are some of the biggest takeaways from my trip.
Cutting-edge biotech in China is surprisingly expensive
Among the ambitious, well-funded startups I visited, the simple arbitrage story–comparable cutting-edge innovation for a fraction of the price–felt less like the reality.
I was surprised to be regularly meeting PhD scientists earning the equivalent of $100,000 to $150,000 a year – these were comparable to many US scientist wages.
I was also surprised to find it a common case that Seed rounds of $1-5 million were going for valuations between $10-25 million, and Series A rounds of $20-30 million were buying just 20-30% of a company. Those figures are also aligned with many deals in Silicon Valley or Boston.
There are indeed real savings in parts of the biotech stack–for example, life-science real estate in Shanghai can cost roughly $20–40 per square foot per year versus around $65 in the Bay Area. Salaries at Chinese CROs for more established work streams and CDMOs are estimated to be about 62% below global benchmarks, and Chinese animal work can offer savings as well (although primate studies are increasingly approaching as expensive as elsewhere, with monkeys in China now running around $27,000 each). It’s just a more mixed bag than I had expected.
Startups felt a little less sophisticated, and lacked the infamous 996 work ethic
I did not leave my trip believing that Chinese scientists were broadly ahead of the best U.S. groups on genuinely novel therapeutic technologies.
China’s top scientists were clearly quite capable; they were doing serious work, thinking about many of the right frontiers, and operating far beyond the dated caricature of China merely copying Western programs or operating fraudulently.
But anecdotally through my fund SciFounders, I have interacted with a couple thousand biotech and health-technology startups over the past five years, and against my admittedly subjective benchmark, the strongest U.S. companies and founders still seemed stronger to me than the strongest Chinese counterparts.
China’s ecosystem seems to heavily favor a model in which a professor co-founds a company and remains a professor. I am skeptical of that structure even in the U.S., but in China, it seems even harder to make work. In the US there is typically a professional team that gets brought in by investors or the professor, but in China it seems the Professor is often still fully in control of the company while also deeply divided in focus with academic responsibilities.
Younger, scrappier founders building companies independently of the status quo certainly existed, but they seemed less culturally accepted by institutions and investors, and frequently had a harder time raising capital. Wearing my investor hat, I repeatedly found myself wishing there was a politically and regulatorily viable way to support some of these founders. Many had trained at institutions such as Stanford or MIT and genuinely admired the U.S. startup ecosystem, but lacked access to strong mentorship from experienced founders, operators, and investors, which seemed like a shame given their hearts are in the right place of trying to improve the world.
There are clear exceptions nonetheless. XtalPi is a genuinely founder-led AI drug-discovery company I visited that has raised close to $2 billion of equity capital. I also spent time with the Co-CEO of WuXi AppTec, and it was amazing to see how they’ve built a 35,000 person company in a quarter of a century. And Bioyond Robotics was an earlier stage lab robotics company I found quite impressive. But the broader company-building layer felt less mature than the best of Boston or Silicon Valley (and of note, both of the companies just mentioned had founders that spent very significant amounts of time in the US before transitioning back to China to build their companies).
Overall, this is not a claim that China is weak at discovery. For more established small molecule or antibody technologies, or single asset companies, it is indeed a serious threat. And they do have huge advantages generally in areas like medicinal chemistry and manufacturing for many modalities. Nor is it a claim that their ecosystem can’t continue to improve and surpass us. But at present time, it feels like the US clearly still has a lot to offer and stay ahead on.
Incidentally too, I found it very interesting that it did not seem like the average biotech culture encountered had that intense of a work ethic — 996 seemed to be much more of a software / engineering company thing. Scientists at biotechs, it seemed, were typically working ~8-9 hour days, mirroring most of US biotech companies as well.
Chinese companies face major headwinds that US startups don’t
China’s top-down, state-directed structure can lead to huge long-term advantages, but it also seems to create meaningful distortions and disadvantages as well.
Provincial leaders and mayors effectively operate as CEOs of their regions, competing with other provinces for investment, infrastructure, employment, and economic growth. That competition can mobilize resources with a speed that is difficult to imagine in the US. A field designated as a national priority can suddenly receive coordinated attention from universities, hospitals, startups, investors, and provincial governments on massive yet competitive scales.
But the same system can distort company behavior. Upwards of 85% of Chinese venture capital comes from government-affiliated limited partners, and their incentives are different from normal private LPs. I repeatedly heard that government LPs care heavily about local job creation, local facilities, and geographic commitments. These are rational goals for a provincial government, but do not always align with what it takes to build high-impact companies.
As a result, funds may encourage startups to build facilities prematurely, hire in a particular region, or pursue strategies that fit local industrial policy better than the needs of the business. Funds may also be less sophisticated, and founders often have to sign term sheets holding them personally accountable to pay back money if things do not work out.
Additionally, state-sponsored capitalism only goes so far in the health technology ecosystem; capitalism is still ultimately not something to be outright celebrated, and the government cares much more about developing cheap cures for its populace than building large biotech companies – there is significant pressure from China’s public-medical insurance system via the National Reimbursement Drug List (NRDL) to charge for close to cost of production within China, regardless of what the investment was that took to develop them.
China’s clinical advantage is very real
The clinical system was the clearest China advantage that I encountered.
China’s Investigator-Initiated Trial (IIT) pathway allows medical institutions to launch certain studies through their own review processes, at speeds that can even be just a few weeks with lower GMP requirements. These include trials involving cutting-edge cell and gene therapies and complex devices such as brain-computer interfaces. Its drug regulator has also streamlined parts of the conventional investigational new drug pathway outside to be reviewed a lot faster.
China combines this with a massive and unusually concentrated patient population. Of the highest quality hospitals, Grade 3A, there are only about 1,800 facilities for 1.4 billion people — the flip side of the limited supply is it allows major centers to recruit for trials exceedingly rapidly and with less competition from overlapping studies. Investigator fees, hospital costs, CRO expenses, and associated services are also much lower than in the U.S – depending on the trial and the source, costs can be anywhere from 30% cheaper per patient to close to 65% cheaper.
Some of this deserves skepticism. Several people raised concerns about patient cherry-picking, uneven ethical review, and whether data generated through certain pathways would meet U.S. regulatory standards – recent discussion has also included multiple cases of gene editing trials that have resulted in deaths that were clearly inappropriate to proceed.
But dismissing the entire advantage as laxity would be a mistake. There are certainly benefits that can come from speed, especially as standards continue to improve; I assume this will be the case, as Chinese companies ultimately want to sell into the US, and if not just feeling the pressure internally, they will also want to make sure standards stay aligned with the FDA.
I would not argue that the U.S. should copy China’s clinical system wholesale, but there is a lot to learn here if we want to stay competitive on the clinical trial front and develop cures safely and rapidly.
The ecosystem felt remarkably accessible and collaborative for English-speaking outsiders
This may have been my biggest surprise of the trip. Many senior scientists, founders, investors, and institutional leaders we met had trained at leading American or European universities, or worked at Western pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies before returning to China.
On the whole, the folks I met had fond associations with America. They were extraordinarily kind, generous with their time, and interested in collaboration. University deans, major public company CEOs, scientists, and hospital leaders frequently spent hours meeting with me and other biotech founders I was traveling with, even on very short notice. There was also generally not a sense of transactionalism to the meetings as well – nothing was really expected in return.
As a non-Mandarin speaker, I was also surprised by how common English was spoken amongst the biotech community. For example, during a visit to Huashan Hospital (one of Shanghai’s leading clinical-research hospitals), I was surprised to sit-in on the neurosurgery department’s daily meeting and learn that it is always conducted in English.
There was genuine hunger for research partnerships. We were told that Chinese clinicians historically concentrated heavily on care delivery and did relatively little academic research. More recently, institutions have placed growing pressure on clinicians to publish. Some of the people overseeing trials were therefore eager to work with U.S. companies that could bring interesting technologies and generate meaningful research.
None of this eliminates IP risk or geopolitical tension, but it made it seem like a much more promising prospect to explore areas of mutual benefit for US biotech founders of all stages than I had anticipated.
For example, a US company that can get earlier access to human data may support a fundraise, clarify a development path, or show that an asset should be abandoned before another two years and tens of millions of dollars are spent on it. This could be huge, and is something worth considering rather than thinking all Chinese collaboration is alarming. Likewise, accessing parts of the pre-clinical ecosystem that are indeed cheaper can be beneficial for earlier-stage startups as well.
More founders and investors should visit
There are a bunch more takeaways I could share, but overall I’m hoping to illustrate my perspective that there is a lot more nuance to the whole China debate than it may seem just from social media.
If you are in a position that touches China, be it in biotech or otherwise, I would seriously encourage you to just go make your own visit. It really wasn’t that hard to organize, and overall it felt safe.
To be clear, I would take information precautions seriously – for example, I got a burner phone, a burner iPad, and I didn’t log into my normal email. I would still do this again (and it honestly is a hassle!).
But once I was there, it really did feel different than I imagined. It felt like a parallel world that is fascinating in its differences, and in many ways complimentary to the US rather than a zero sum competition. I’m sure there are a lot of things I missed and in some ways my takes could be wrong (it was only a two week trip), but it was overall so helpful to be there and form my own viewpoint.
Overall, I really do hope there are ways the two ecosystems can come closer together rather than continue to drift apart. There are broader realities to being adversaries, but it would be a shame if things must further bifurcate so heavily when there are ways that biotech companies of all stages (as well as all of humanity) could benefit from deeper trust and health collaborations of actual mutual benefit.
Thanks to Niko McCarty, Milan Cvitkovic, Lucas Harrington and Alex Schubert for reading drafts of this post.


